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Note
CHEEK V. UNITED STATES: FINALLY, A PRECISE
DEFINITION OF THE WILLFULNESS
REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL TAX CRIMES
INTRODUCTION
In Cheek v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that a defend-
ant on trial for evasion of federal income taxes must be acquitted if
the jury finds that he sincerely believed he was not violating the law,
regardless of whether the defendant's belief was "objectively rea-
sonable."2 However, a defendant's belief in the unconstitutionality
of the tax laws will not serve as a defense.3 By reversing the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had upheld the trial
court's use of the objective reasonableness standard,4 the Court fi-
nally laid to rest a persistently troublesome problem of statutory
construction: how to interpret the word "willfully" in the context of
the tax crime statutes.5
After first reviewing the Court's previous interpretations of the
willfulness requirement, this Note assesses the soundness of the
Cheek decision, concluding that it strikes a sensible balance between
disciplined regard for the dictates of precedent and awareness of
practical policy ramifications. The Court wisely chose to heed the
principle of stare decisis rather than follow the Seventh Circuit's
adoption of a standard of objective reasonableness, which would
have benefitted judicial economy at the expense of logic and consis-
tency. The Court did display sensitivity to the issue ofjudicial econ-
omy, however, by holding that a defendant's belief that a statute is
unconstitutional will not serve as a defense. 6
I. THE CASE
John L. Cheek, a pilot for American Airlines since 1973,
1. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
2. Id. at 611.
3. Id. at 613.
4. See United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated and re-
manded, I1I S. Ct. 604 (1991).
5. See infra note 12.
6. See Cheek, I1I S. Ct. at 613.
224
WILLFULNESS IN TAX CRIMES
stopped filing income tax returns after 1979.' Beginning in 1980,
he began claiming an inordinately large number of withholding al-
lowances;' and in the years 1981 to 1984 he claimed on his W-4
forms that he was exempt from federal income taxes.9 In 1982,
Cheek failed in an attempt to obtain a refund of all tax withheld by
his employer that year.'o For these tax-protest activities, Cheek was
indicted on March 7, 1987 and charged with three counts of willfully
attempting to evade income taxes for the years 1980, 1981, and
1983, in violation of section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code;"
and with six counts of willfully failing to file a federal income tax
return for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 through 1986, in violation
of section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code.' 2
During the trial, at which Cheek represented himself, the evi-
dence revealed that Cheek's failure to pay taxes stemmed from his
involvement in the tax protest movement.'" Cheek had attended
several seminars featuring speakers, some of whom were lawyers,
who maintained that the federal tax laws were unconstitutional, as
was their enforcement by the government.' 4 The thrust of Cheek's
defense was that his actions were lawful because he sincerely be-
lieved during the years in question that the tax laws were being en-
forced unconstitutionally. Moreover, he claimed to have believed
that wages are not income and that he therefore was not required to
file a return based on his wages.' 5 Thus, Cheek argued, he had not
7. Id. at 606.
8. By the middle of 1980 Cheek was claiming 60 exemptions. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 606-07. Section 7201 reads, in pertinent part: "Any person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title shall... be guilty
of a felony .... " I.R.C. § 7201 (1988).
12. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 606-07. Section 7203 provides: "Any person.., who will-
fully fails to pay such estimated tax or taxes, make such return, keep such records, or
supply such information... shall... be guilty of a misdemeanor .. " I.R.C. § 7203.
Nearly all of the criminal tax provisions include the requirement of willfulness. See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7202, 7204-7207, 7213.
13. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 607. The tax protest movement, whose members commonly
believe that the federal tax laws and enforcement procedures are unconstitutional, has
been a thorn in the side of federal prosecutors and the federal courts. Seegenerally Miller
v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing problems tax protesters
have caused the courts, and noting that in 1981 the Internal Revenue Service investi-
gated 13,600 illegal protest returns); Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse
Except for Tax Crimes, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 221, 228-32 (1989) (discussing the defense tactics
of tax protesters, and condemning them for "clutter[ing] the courts with asininity [and]
risking incarceration while spreading, unfortunately, the gospel of the inane").
14. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 607.
15. Id.
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acted with the willfulness that is an essential element of the crimes
with which he was charged. 16
The trial judge instructed the jury that "[a]n honest but unrea-
sonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness,""
and that "[a]dvice or research resulting in the conclusion that wages
of a privately employed person are not income or that the tax laws
are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot serve
as the basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense.""8
Cheek was convicted on all counts,' 9 and the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the stan-
dard of objective reasonableness was the proper test for willfulness
in the Seventh Circuit, and that consequently the district court had
not erred in its instructions.2 °
Because the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the term "will-
fully" in the tax crime statutes conflicted with those of several other
circuits, 2 1 the Supreme Court granted certiorari2 2 to resolve the
conflict.2 3 By a six to two majority, in a well-reasoned opinion au-
thored by Justice White, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit,
holding that it was error to instruct the jury to disregard Cheek's
claims that he honestly believed he was not required to file a return
and that wages are not taxable income.24 If the jury had believed
Cheek's claims, "the Government would not have carried its burden
to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem
such a belief."' 25 The Court further held, however, that the district
court judge was correct in instructing the jury not to consider
Cheek's views about the unconstitutionality of the tax laws, because
16. Id. See generally Yochum, supra note 13, at 230-31 (discussing the strength of this
kind of argument).
17. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 608.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 609.
20. United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated and re-
manded, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
21. Cheek, Ill S. Ct. at 609 (citing United States v. Whiteside, 810 F.2d 1306, 13 10-
11 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 263-64 (10th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188, 191-93 (1st Cir. 1985)); see also infra notes 47-48
and accompanying text (elaborating on the collision of the Seventh Circuit and other
circuits' decisions).
22. See Cheek v. United States, I 10 S. Ct. 1108 (1990).
23. Cheek, III S. Ct. at 611.
24. See id. Upon remand, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court
for retrial on the sole issue of whether Cheek sincerely believed that he was not required
to file a return or that wages were not taxable income. United States v. Cheek, 931 F.2d
1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1991).
25. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 611.
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these views were "irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. ' 26
Justice Scalia concurred with the majority's result, but argued
that errors about constitutional validity should also be allowed as a
defense. 27 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, approved of the Seventh Circuit's objective reasonableness
standard.28
II. THE WILLFULNESS DOCTRINE PRIOR TO CHEEK
The Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of the term
"willfully" as it appears in the tax crime statutes at issue in United
States v. Murdock. 29 In Murdock, the Court held that a defendant be-
ing tried under the predecessor of section 720530 of the Internal
Revenue Code was entitled to an instruction directing the jury to
consider whether he had acted "in good faith and based upon his
actual belief.'" Such an instruction was required because the term
"willfully" meant the presence of a "bad purpose '3 2 or "evil mo-
tive."3" In adopting this interpretation, the Court rejected an alter-
native construction of willfulness: that the defendant's actions be
"intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from acci-
dental."3 4 The Court explained that "Congress did not intend that
a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liabil-
ity for the tax, [or] as to his duty to make a return .... should be-
come a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed
standard of conduct."
3 5
In requiring "bad purpose" or "evil motive," the Murdock Court
interpreted the statutory tax crimes as specific intent crimes, mean-
ing that this special mental state constituted a distinct element of
those offenses.3 ' This interpretation may have been influenced by
26. Id. at 613.
27. See id. at 613-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. See id. at 614-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
30. The predecessor of § 7205, which was virtually identical, was § 145(b) of the
Revenue Act of 1936. See I.R.C. § 145(b) (1936).
31. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 393.
32. Id. at 394.
33. Id. at 395.
34. Id. at 394.
35. Id. at 396.
36. See id. at 397-98 ("The respondent's refusal to answer was intentional and with-
out legal justification, but the jury might nevertheless find that it was not prompted by
bad faith or evil intent which the statute makes an element of the offense."); see also
Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 609 (asserting that Congress carved out an exception to the tradi-
tional rule "by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal
2271992]
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the prevailing practice of the legal community to divide crimes be-
tween those mala in se and those mala prohibita, and by the view that it
was morally wrong to impose stiff penalties for mere mala prohibita
offenses without requiring proof of knowledge of criminality. 37
Thus, in requiring evil motive, the Murdock Court was responding to
the seeming unfairness of imposing heavy penalties for what were
considered to be "regulatory offense[s]." 38
In United States v. Bishop,39 the Court attempted to define willful-
ness more precisely when it held that the "bad purpose" or "evil
motive" of Murdock referred to "a voluntary, intentional violation of
a known legal duty,"4 adding that Congress's intent in including
the willfulness requirement was to "construct penalties that separate
the purposeful tax violator from the well-meaning, but easily con-
fused, mass of taxpayers."'" Three years later, in response to de-
fense arguments citing the "bad purpose-evil motive" language to
justify demands for separate jury instructions on good faith,42 the
Court in United States v. Pomponio43 firmly defined willfulness as not
"requir[ing] any motive other than an intentional violation of a
known legal duty. ' 44
Given the Court's approval of an instruction containing the
phrase "good faith and . . . actual belief" in Murdock,45 and its later
use of the phrase "known legal duty" in defining willfulness,46 it is
not surprising that most federal circuit courts determined that will-
criminal tax offenses"). See generally Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal
Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 45-51 (1939) (containing a detailed discussion of specific
intent crimes and the ignorance of law defense).
37. See Yochum, supra note 13, at 226; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 252-57 (1952) (setting out a thorough analysis of maa prohibita offenses and the use
by courts of specific intent requirements to "protect those who were not blameworthy in
mind").
38. Yochum, supra note 13, at 226. Yochum argues that this rationale has long
ceased to make sense: "What has not occurred in the tax crime area is a recognition
that, socially, the tax obligations of the citizen have moved from an arcane regulatory
burden to a fundamentally understood part of American life." Id. Though he does not
believe that this can properly be addressed by the courts, Yochum argues forcefully for
congressional amendment of the tax crime statutes. See id. at 232-35.
39. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
40. Id. at 360.
41. Id. at 361.
42. See Yochum, supra note 13, at 225 n.19.
43. 429 U.S. 10 (1976).
44. Id. at 12.
45. 290 U.S. 389, 393 (1933) (emphasis added).
46. See United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973); Pomponio, 429 U.S. at 12;
see also supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
228 [VOL. 51:224
WILLFULNESS IN TAX CRIMES
fulness must be evaluated using a subjective standard. 47 The excep-
tion was the Seventh Circuit, which in 1980 clearly articulated its
view in United States v. Moore48 that even in tax crimes "[t]he mistake
of law defense is extremely limited and the mistake must be objec-
tively reasonable."'49  During the 1980s, many tax protesters ap-
pealed their district court convictions to the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, insisting that the objective reasonableness standard had
allowed them to be convicted without the government proving that
they had violated a "known legal duty."50 The Seventh Circuit uni-
formly rejected these arguments, refusing to read Pomponio and its
predecessors as requiring a subjective standard5' and declining to
follow the contrary views of the other circuits.52
The practical effect of the reasonableness standard employed
by the Seventh Circuit was to make it easier for government prose-
cutors to convict tax protesters.53 These protesters had earned the
ire of judges who saw them both as a cause of overcrowded court
47. See United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1985) ("With the ex-
ception of the Seventh Circuit .... no other circuit has approved of an objective stan-
dard in failure to file cases."); see also United States v. Whiteside, 810 F.2d 1306, 1310
(5th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he ultimate factual issue.., was whether appellant actually held his
erroneous views of the law."); United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188, 193 (1st Cir. 1985)
("[R]easonableness of a mistake of law should not be a factor."); United States v.
Kraeger, 711 F.2d 6, 7 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a good faith misunderstanding of law
is a defense, but a good faith disagreement is not).
48. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980).
49. Id. at 833. This view of the law is not well supported by authority and is likely
incorrect. Although there is a strong common-law tradition that ignorance of the law is
no defense, certain specific intent crimes such as tax offenses have long been excepted
from this rule. See Aitken, 755 F.2d at 193 (Tax crimes are an "enclave apart" from
common-law crimes, in which "the mistake of law defense has particular vitality, and the
key is whether the defendant honestly held a mistaken belief as to what the law re-
quires."); cf. Perkins, supra note 36, at 52 (For specific intent crimes, "guilt may be dis-
proved by an honest belief inconsistent with such an intent, even if the belief results
from a mistake of law not based upon reasonable grounds.").
One commentator has theorized that "the Seventh Circuit fell into error ... in the
great nether world of mistake of law and fact defenses." Yochum, supra note 13, at 230.
This is plausible, because reasonableness is generally required for mistakes of fact, but
not for mistakes of law. See Perkins, supra note 36, at 52-56.
50. See generally Yochum, supra note 13, at 229-30 (discussing representative cases).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated and
remanded, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991); United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir.
1987) (determining that "only objectively reasonable mistakes negate the necessary
mental element for tax offenses"); United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir.
1987) (stating that the Seventh Circuit had read Pomponio as permitting a reasonableness
standard).
52. For cases illustrating the alignment of other circuits with the subjective standard,
see supra note 47.
53. At trials for tax crimes, it is of course the prosecutor who requests the applica-
tion of the reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Aitken, 755 F.2d at 189-90.
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dockets and as bearers of frivolous claims and "tired arguments. ' ' 4
The usual defense raised by these protesters was that they had not
willfully violated the tax laws because they had acted in accordance
with what they believed the law required. These defense claims
were commonly premised on beliefs that wages earned from private
corporations are not taxable income and that Federal Reserve Notes
have no value.51 It followed that a jury instructed to apply a stan-
dard of reasonableness to a protester's claims had little choice but
to convict.5 6 In fact, courts often used the reasonableness standard
to rule as a matter of law that these and similar beliefs could not
negate willfulness, thus taking the issue entirely away from the
jury.5 7 The Court of Appeals had gone so far as to compile a list of
seven "stock arguments of the tax protester movement" that would
never be considered objectively reasonable in the Seventh Circuit."
These arguments could be defeated via an instruction directing the
jury to disregard evidence supporting them59 or by an order exclud-
ing such evidence during the course of the tria. 6°
A good example of the latter approach appears in United States
54. See Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70-72 (7th Cir. 1986). In reviewing
the Seventh Circuit's decisions in cases involving tax protesters, one quickly notices the
unusually blunt tone of the opinions. It almost seems as if these judges hope that scorn-
ful language will deter future litigation by tax protesters, when upheld convictions and
the use of civil sanctions have not. See, e.g., Buckner, 830 F.2d at 103 (maintaining that if
courts accepted every mistake of law as a defense, people would choose to be delusional
about the law); Dube, 820 F.2d at 887-89 (derisively describing tax protesters' activities
as a "sham church"); Coleman, 791 F.2d at 69 ("Some people believe with great fervor
preposterous things that just happen to coincide with their self-interest.").
55. See Buckner, 830 F.2d at 103; Dube, 820 F.2d at 891. Some tax protesters have
professed belief in even more unusual ideas. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d
532, 534 n.l (10th Cir. 1989) (Defendant claimed that he resisted the "tyranny" of IRS
agents because they were "Satan's little helpers.").
56. The jury at Cheek's trial was clearly unhappy with the objective reasonableness
standard. They expressed their dissatisfaction by taking the unusual step of submitting
a note to the judge along with their guilty verdict. The note stated that several jurors
wished to air "a complaint against the narrow and hard expression under the constraints
of the law." Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 608 n.6.
57. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text for representative cases.
58. United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1268-69 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated and
remanded, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991). The list, which the court felt could only expand over
time, included the following seven beliefs: that the Sixteenth Amendment was never
ratified, that the Sixteenth Amendment is unconstitutional, that income tax violates the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, that the tax laws are unconstitutional, that wages
are not income and therefore are not taxable, that filing a tax return violates the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, and that Federal Reserve Notes are not legal tender. Id.
59. See United States v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1517-18 & nn.8-9 (7th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830, 833 & n.l (7th Cir. 1980).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987).
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v. Buckner.6 In Buckner, the district court had granted the prosecu-
tor's request to exclude evidence relating to the defendant's various
theories about taxation.62 The Seventh Circuit, in approving what it
termed "a preemptive strike"6 by the prosecutor, candidly stated
its rationale for prohibiting the "obtuse" tax protester from using
his allegedly sincere beliefs as a defense: "If the legal system ac-
cepts every mistake of law as a defense, this leads people to be igno-
rant, to delude themselves, or to tell tall tales to the jury. '"'  Despite
this argument's logical basis in policy (after all, the tax protesters'
manipulation of the judicial system was at the expense of the gov-
ernment, courts, and other litigants), it would not be persuasive in
the Supreme Court.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING IN CHEEK
In Cheek, the Supreme Court confronted two questions: first,
whether the willfulness requirement found in the criminal provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code demands a subjective reason-
ableness standard-that a defendant's allegedly honest, though
irrational, misunderstanding of law be considered a valid defense-
or instead permits an objective reasonableness standard;65 and sec-
ond, whether a defendant's claimed "good faith" belief in the un-
constitutionality of the tax statutes is relevant to the issue of
willfulness .66
The majority began its analysis by noting that "[tihe general
rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to
criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal sys-
tem."6 7 However, the Court recognized that, because of the com-
plexity of tax statutes and regulations, in some instances Congress
had mitigated that presumption by requiring that a prosecutor
prove specific intent.6" The Court proceeded to review Murdock,
Bishop, and Pomponio, and from them it concluded that "the standard
for the statutory willfulness requirement is the 'voluntary, inten-
tional violation of a known legal duty.' ",69 Consequently, the gov-
ernment bears the burden of proving "actual knowledge of the
61. 830 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1987).
62. Id. at 103.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 609-12.
66. Id. at 612-14.
67. Id. at 609 (citations omitted).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 609-10.
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pertinent legal duty." 7 This burden cannot be met if the defendant
can convince the finder of fact that, based on a misunderstanding of
the tax code, he had a good faith belief that he was complying with
the code.7 The Court explained its reasoning:
In the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence,
the Government has proved that the defendant was aware
of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury credits
a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission,
whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is
objectively reasonable.72
Thus, the jury should have been allowed to consider Cheek's claim
that he believed the tax laws did not treat wages as income, and to
acquit him if they determined that he honestly held that belief.
73
The majority bolstered this conclusion by noting that an objec-
tive reasonableness standard may abrogate the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial provision by giving a court the power to decide the key
factual issue in many cases.74 Because it is clearly possible for a de-
fendant to be "ignorant of his duty based on an irrational belief that
he has no duty,"' 75 forbidding the jury to consider that belief-which
could negate the essential element of willfulness-may be unconsti-
tutional.76 The majority put the final nail in the coffin of the objec-
tive standard by noting the Court's traditional policy of interpreting
statutes so as to avoid raising serious constitutional questions.77
The Court next addressed the issue of whether a defendant's
beliefs about the constitutional validity of the tax laws can negate
the willfulness requirement. Concluding that these views "are irrel-
evant to the issue of willfulness," 7 8 the Court held that it was not
error for the trial judge to instruct the jury to disregard Cheek's
beliefs on this subject. 79 Emphasizing the congressional intent rec-
ognized in the Murdock-Pomponio line of cases-the desire to protect
70. Id. at 610.
71. Id. at 610-11.
72. Id. at 611.
73. Id. The Court added, though, that "the jury would be free to consider any ad-
missible evidence from any source showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a
return and to treat wages as income." Id.
74. Id. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal trials, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ..... U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
75. Cheek, I llS. Ct. at 611.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 613.
79. See id.
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taxpayers who make "innocent errors" as a result of our "complex
tax system"S0 -the Court contrasted Cheek's constitutional views,
which "reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied
conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and
unenforceable." 8' Furthermore, Cheek could have paid his tax,
filed for a refund, and then brought a civil claim if the refund was
denied. 2 His faulty constitutional ideas, though, would not save
him from conviction for willfully violating the tax laws.
IV. ANALYSIS
In criticizing the majority's rejection of the objective reason-
ableness standard, Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent that
Cheek's claimed misunderstandings did not result from "the com-
plexities of the tax laws,"8" but rather involved the code's "most
elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are
wages income?"8 4 Blackmun expressed disbelief that seventy years
after the establishment of the present federal income tax system,
citizens of "competent mentality"8 5 could avoid conviction by claim-
ing to believe that wage earners are not taxpayers and wages are not
income. The dissent concluded with an echo of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decisions:86 "This Court's opinion today, I fear, will en-
courage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of the law in the hope
of convincing a jury of their sincerity." ' 7
While the Court no doubt was aware that by approving an ob-
jective reasonableness standard it might deter would-be tax protes-
ters from violating the law, or at least from wasting the time and
resources of appellate courts, it wisely chose to respect the unmis-
takable dictates of the Murdock-Pomponio line of cases. The Murdock
Court made clear that tax crimes were specific intent offenses, not-
80. Id. at 612 (citing United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1973)).
81. Id. at 612-13.
82. Id. at 613. Many tax protesters have challenged the validity of the tax laws in civil
actions, but, as a Seventh Circuit judge put it, these claims are "sanction-bait." United
States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Coleman v. Commissioner,
791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986) (approving sanctions against tax protester for filing frivolous
claim, then imposing additional sanctions for frivolous appeal).
83. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 614 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 615.
86. See, e.g., Buckner, 830 F.2d at 103-04 (discussed supra, text accompanying notes
61-64); cf. Coleman, 791 F.2d at 72 ("The more costly obtuseness becomes, the less there
will be.").
87. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ing that "evil motive is a constituent element of the crime. '"88 In
both Bishop and Pomponio, the Court defined the required evil motive
as "the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."89
Basic principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence, as re-
flected in the Supreme Court's longstanding interpretation of the
Constitution, dictate that when a special intention is made an ele-
ment of an offense, whether the defendant had the requisite mental
state is an issue of fact that must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and decided upon by the factfinder.9 ° The Seventh Circuit's
requirement of objective reasonableness, then, appears to have
abridged two distinct but related constitutional guarantees: The
Due Process Clause's requirement that the prosecutor prove a de-
fendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,9 ' and the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of trial by jury.92
The majority could have strengthened its opinion with a more
extensive discussion of the burden of proof problem inherent in an
objective standard, for this is probably the most compelling reason
to reject such a standard. When a court requires that a defendant's
erroneous beliefs be "objectively reasonable," it effectively creates a
rebuttable presumption of intent;9" even if the court does not pro-
nounce these beliefs unreasonable as a matter of law (thus allowing
the jury to consider them), the jury still must find willfulness unless
the defendant has convinced them that his views were reasonable.
The Supreme Court has held that even rebuttable presumptions of
intent are generally unconstitutional, for they impermissibly shift
88. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933). The Murdock Court noted
as an example a revenue statute proscribing a method of conducting a business to pre-
vent loss of tax revenue. Because "a willful failure to obscure the directions [is] a penal
offense," an integral element of the offense is an evil motive. Id. (alluding to Felton v.
United States, 96 U.S. 699 (1877)).
89. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 360; Pomponio, 429 U.S. at 12.
90. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1 (a)
(1986); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) ("Where intent of
the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact which
must be submitted to the jury."); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 318 (1985) (over-
turning defendant's murder conviction because jury instruction created "an unconstitu-
tional burden-shifting presumption with respect to the element of intent").
91. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[Tjhe Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
92. For the pertinent text of the Sixth Amendment, see supra note 74.
93. A presumption has been defined as describing "situations in which the court
instructs a jury that proof of one fact entitles the jury to infer, assume, or presume the
existence of another fact." STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 877
(1984).
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the burden of proof to the defendant.94 In cases involving tax
protesters like Cheek who claim an honest belief in unreasonable
views, the objective reasonableness requirement imposes an impos-
sible burden on the defendant (even when a jury is allowed to de-
cide the issue): the defendant simply cannot prove that these views
are reasonable. It is certainly appropriate for jurors to consider the
objective reasonableness of a defendant's belief as one factor in
judging the defendant's credibility,9" but as the threshold test it in-
excusably dispenses with the prosecutor's duty to prove every ele-
ment of the offense.
The majority did effectively address the closely related issue of
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 9 6 The objec-
tive reasonableness standard allowed the district judge, not the jury,
to decide whether Cheek's claims that he misunderstood the tax
laws negated willfulness. The Court made this point precisely when
it noted that "knowledge and belief are characteristically questions
for the factfinder,"'9 7 and that "[c]haracterizing a particular belief as
not objectively reasonable transforms the inquiry into a legal one
and would prevent the jury from considering it."9" The Court's
subsequent reference to its traditional policy of attempting to inter-
pret statutes so as to avoid raising constitutional questions further
reinforced its conclusion by casting it as an example of appropriate
judicial restraint. 99
In deciding the second issue in Cheek-the relevance of a de-
fendant's views on the constitutionality of tax laws-the Court sensi-
bly drew a line apparently intended to place a limit on the ability of
tax protesters to consume the time and resources of the courts and
94. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 317 (holding that a rebuttable presumption of intent vio-
lates due process by "reliev[ing] the State of the affirmative burden of persuasion on the
presumed element by instructing the jury that it must find the presumed element unless
the defendant persuades the jury not to make such a finding"); Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510, 520-24 (1979) (holding jury instruction constitutionally improper because
it did not force the State to prove "'beyond a reasonable doubt... every fact necessary
to constitute the crime' " (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970))).
95. See United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 622-23 (10th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Turano, 802 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1986).
96. See Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 611; see supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
97. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 611.
98. Id.; cf. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933) ("[T]he decision of
issues of fact must be fairly left to the jury.").
99. See Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 611; see also, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (holding that the
Court will construe a statute so as to avoid constitutional questions "unless such con-
struction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"); cf. supra note 38 (noting that
Congress may amend the tax crime statutes, as at least one commentator has urged).
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the government. By holding that such views are "irrelevant to the
issue of willfulness" t0 and need not be heard or considered by a
jury, the Court was in effect stating that a defendant commits an
"intentional violation of a known legal duty" when he refuses to
comply with what he knows the statute purports to mean because of
his erroneous opinion that the statute is unconstitutional.' 0 '
In a strongly worded but ultimately unconvincing concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia objected to the logic behind this assertion:
I find it impossible to understand how one can derive from
the lonesome word "willfully" the proposition that belief in
the nonexistence of a textual prohibition excuses liability,
but belief in the invalidity (i.e., the legal nonexistence) of a
textual prohibition does not.10 2
Citing Marbury v. Madison,' 3 Scalia argued that it is conceptually im-
possible to say that defendants violate a "known legal duty" when
they disregard a statute that they believe to be unconstitutional, be-
cause if the statute was in fact unconstitutional it would impose no
legal duty.10 4
Although this argument is interesting and theoretically compel-
ling, the majority wisely rejected it, choosing instead to focus on
Congress's intent in placing the word "willfully" in the tax crime
statutes. After remarking that Cheek's constitutional opinions "re-
veal full knowledge of the provisions at issue,"' 0 5 and that Cheek
had passed up the opportunity to test his beliefs in a civil action,' 6
Justice White wrote:
We do not believe that Congress contemplated that such a
taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, could ig-
nore the duties imposed upon him by the Internal Revenue
Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms provided by
Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts
and to abide by their decisions. 0 7
This argument is sound. It is difficult to believe that Congress, in
enacting taxation statutes, or the Supreme Court, in interpreting
100. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 613.
101. See id. at 612-13. Cheek's attorney expressed agreement with this view at oral
argument: "[P]ersonal belief that a known statute is unconstitutional smacks of knowl-
edge with existing law, but disagreement with it." Id. at 612 n.9.
102. Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
104. See Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 613-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 612.
106. Id. at 613.
107. Id.
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them, anticipated that a person who understood the purported du-
ties imposed by the tax laws could violate them and escape convic-
tion merely because that person believed the tax system to be
unconstitutional. As the authors of a recent article about the Cheek
decision have noted, common sense supports the majority's posi-
tion, as "Congress doubtless supposed its revenue laws were within
Constitutional bounds."' 8
Finally, although the Court did not acknowledge this, it must
also have been aware that excluding constitutional beliefs as a de-
fense would benefit judicial economy. While one cannot be certain
in predicting the actual effect of this exclusion, it seems likely that
fewer tax protest cases will go to trial, and that those that do will
consume less time. This practical concern may explain why the ex-
clusion of constitutional beliefs has been the rule in several of the
circuits,' 0 9 contrary to Justice Scalia's contention that the majority's
opinion "works a revolution in past practice.
l1o
CONCLUSION
In Cheek, the Supreme Court finally announced the definitive in-
terpretation of the willfulness requirement of the federal tax crime
statutes. By holding that a defendant's claimed misunderstanding
of the tax laws need not be objectively reasonable in order to negate
willfulness, the Court brought the Seventh Circuit in line with the
other circuits. But more significantly, the Court made clear that
there can be no short-cuts in the prosecution of a specific intent
offense, and at the same time reaffirmed the vitality of stare decisis
by indicating that a circuit court may not ignore the clear dictates of
Supreme Court precedent,"' no matter how unfortunate the effect
108. Jules Ritholz & David M. Kohane, Supreme Court Finds Subjective Ignorance of the Law
a Defense to Criminal Tax Fraud, 1991 J. TAX'N 258.
109. See United States v. Whiteside, 810 F.2d 1306, 1311 (5th Cir. 1987) (branding
defendant a "willful violator" despite belief that tax laws are unconstitutional); United
States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding beliefs as to unconstitu-
tionality irrelevant to issue of willfulness); United States v. Kraeger, 711 F.2d 6, 7 (2d
Cir. 1983).
110. Cheek, 1II S. Ct. at 614 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. It should be noted that the Court has been anything but steadfast in respecting
stare decisis in its most recent criminal decisions. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, Il1 S.
Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (overruling two recent cases and holding that "victim impact"
statements may be introduced during the penalty phase of capital trials); California v.
Acevedo, 11I S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991) (expanding the "automobile exception" for war-
rantless searches of vehicles and containers found therein, reversing the Chadwick-Sand-
ers rule); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (broadening the harmless
error doctrine so that it may apply to coerced confessions in some instances, departing
from the Chapman rule).
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might be on law enforcement and judicial economy. Finally, by
holding that a tax protester should be prohibited from submitting
his constitutional opinions as a defense to a tax crime, the Court
accurately perceived congressional intent while also making a sound
policy choice.
DWIGHT W. STONE, II
